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AVAILABILITY OF A NEW YORK CLASS
ACTION FOR RAILROAD COMMUTERS:
DAVID V. GOLIATH
I. Introduction
Railroad commuters have the right to expect safe, adequate service,
a sufficient number of train cars for their reasonable accommodation
and reasonable adherence to publicized schedules.' They allege that
railroad corporations such as the Long Island Railroad and Metro-
North constantly breach the implied contract of carriage. 2 Schedule
delays, overcrowded conditions and equipment failures are the most
common complaints. 3 When commuter railroads breach their implied
carriage contracts, travelers receive less than the service they pur-
chased. 4 New York's Consumer Protection Board was established to
promote and ensure high standards of responsibility and performance
in the sale of consumer goods and services. 5 Railroad corporations sell
1. See infra notes 13-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the duties of
common carriers.
2. See, e.g., Dominianni v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 110 Misc. 2d 929, 443
N.Y.S.2d 334 (Civ. Ct. Westchester County 1981) (commuter brought action for
breach of contract alleging delays, lack of heating and overcrowding). See N.Y.
Times, Jan. 5, 1983, at B2, col. 4 (nine lawsuits by commuters accusing Conrail of
poor service in Greenburgh, New York); id., Feb. 6, 1983, § 22, at 1, col. 1 (twenty-
six commuters in Westchester County, New York seek damages of up to $1500 each
against Conrail for alleged breach of implied contract).
3. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1982, at B54, col. 3 (" '[a]ll available indicators
suggest the system deteriorated rapidly from 1976 to 1981' "; " '[e]ven now it is
edging down' ") (quoting New York State Comptroller, Edward V. Regan). On
Metro-North, an average of 105,000 commuters per month had to stand during the
first half of 1982 because 26% of Metro-North's railroad cars were inoperative. Id. at
cols. 3-4 (citing audit by New York State Comptroller's office). "Metro-North said
between 63 and 96 percent of its cars have the air-conditioners on." Id. July 20, 1983,
at B6, col. 5. "But even as improvements are made, hardships persist for many
commuters. On Metro-North, more than 5,000 regular riders continue to stand each
day because of a lack of rail cars. Trains are chronically late, air-conditioning units
often fail and railworkers do not have the tools to make repairs." Id., July 25, 1983,
at B2, col. 4.
4. See, e.g., Dominianni, 110 Misc. 2d at 936, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 340. The terms
of the contract should be commensurate with the cost of plaintiff's commutation
ticket. "While plaintiff is not entitled to luxury class passage, neither should he be
relegated to steerage." Id. (passenger was entitled to refund of ten percent of his
commutation ticket price because he received substandard service).
5. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 553(3)(j) (McKinney 1982). The Board has the power
to "undertake activities to encourage business and industry to maintain high stan-
dards of honesty, fair business practices, and public responsibility in the production,
promotion and sale of consumer goods and services." Id.
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consumer services and should be held to the same standards as other
sellers. 7 Individual lawsuits against the railroads for damages caused
by breaches of the implied carriage contract have not deterred the
railroad corporations from providing substandard performance. 8 For
example, in Kessel v. Long Island Railroad, the court awarded only
one dollar in damages for the defendant's breaches of the carriage
contract." A more effective remedy is needed.
One procedural device for redressing infringements of consumer
rights, the class action, ' 0 can be a potent deterrent of illegal conduct. I
The New York class action statute, modeled upon Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rule 23), was designed to
add a major weapon to the consumer protection arsenal.' 2 A class
action is an appropriate procedural device for remedying the contin-
ual breaches of the commuter carriage contract.
6. See Cohen v. Varig Airlines, S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense,
85 Misc. 2d 653, 380 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1975) (successful breach of
contract action to recover value of baggage lost by common carrier). "As consumers,
the traveling vacationers are entitled to some realistic protection." Id. at 661, 380
N.Y.S,2d at 460. The length of transport has no bearing on the standard of care
imposed by common law and statute on common carriers. See infra notes 15-69.
Anyone who purchases a ticket from a common carrier is a consumer.
7. See, e.g., State of New York by Abrams v. Citibank, N.A., 537 F. Supp.
1192, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Attorney General can seek damages for persistent fraud
or illegality in the transaction); City of New York v. Toby's Electronics, Inc., 110
Misc. 2d 848, 850, 443 N.Y.S.2d 561, 563 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1981) (vendors
cannot engage in deceptive or unconscionable trade practice when selling consumer
goods).
8. See infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
9. See Kessel v. Long Island R.R. Co., 107 Misc. 2d 1067, 436 N.Y.S.2d 684
(Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1981). Damages have been nominal in such actions and
therefore do not provide an incentive to railroads to change their performance level.
In Dominianni, the plaintiff only received $13.80 or 10 percent of his commutation
ticket for two months. 110 Misc. 2d at 936, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 340. In Fendelman v.
Conrail, 119 Misc. 2d 302, 464 N.Y.S.2d 323, 330 (Civ. Ct. Westchester County
1983), the court awarded only $1. In Javeline v. Long Island Railroad, 106 Misc. 2d
814, 818, 435 N.Y.S.2d 513, 516 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1981), the court awarded
$29.90.
10. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 553(3)(c) (McKinney 1982). The commission has the
power and duty to "cooperate with and assist consumers in class actions in proper
cases." Id. For a discussion of consumer class actions, see infra note 163.
11. Memorandum of Gov. Carey, 1975 N.Y. LAWS 1748. The amended law is
designed to change the old law, which provided "no economic deterrent to poor
workmanship, deceptive or unconscionable trade practices and illegal conduct." Id.
12. Id. "While this bill adds a major weapon to the consumer protection arsenal,
it also provides legitimate enterprises with a shield against its abuse . . . . [It]
provides a controlled remedy which recognizes and respects the rights of the class as
well as those of its opponent." Id.
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This Note will discuss whether the New York class action statute
can be an effective method of recovering damages for breaches of the
carriage contract. It concludes that commuter class actions would
meet the five prerequisites of New York's class action statute. 13 A class
action would encourage railroad corporations to meet their statutory
and common law obligations and also compensate commuters for
receiving substandard service. 14 The Note suggests that New York
courts broaden their narrow interpretation of the class action device
to conform with its legislative purpose.
II. Current Duties of the Common Carrier and Current Remedies
for Breach of the Carriage Contract
A. The Common Law Duty of Common Carriers
A contract of carriage creates the relationship of carrier-passen-
ger.' 5 This contract imposes numerous duties on the carrier, in addi-
tion to the obligation to transport the passenger to his destination.1 6 In
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co. ,17 the United
States Supreme Court held that the common law requires that com-
13. See infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the applica-
tion of New York's class action statute to a suit by railroad commuters.
14. See infra notes 176-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy
behind allowing class actions to be used by aggrieved consumers.
15. See Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 9, 203 A.2d 796, 799 (1964)
(duty of common carrier to passenger arises from contract of carriage) (citing Pitts-
burgh Rys. Co. v. Givens, 211 F. 885 (3d Cir. 1914)); accord LaSota v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 421 Pa. 386, 388, 219 A.2d 296, 297 (1966) ("[b]y taking her fare,
common carrier committed itself to the responsibility of transporting her safely and
delivering her safely"). See generally D. MooRE, THE LAW OF CAmainEs 545 (1906)
(relationship between passenger and carrier commences when passenger puts himself
in care of carrier with bona fide intention of being transported).
16. See Owens v. Italia Societa Per Azione Navigazione-Genova, 70 Misc. 2d
719, 723 334 N.Y.S.2d 789, 793 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) (passenger's contract
must be construed to embrace stipulation for such accommodations as are necessary
for reasonable degree of comfort); accord Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 365
F.Supp. 128, 132 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 512 F.2d 527 (D.D.C.
1975) ("[d]efendant's legal duty is to provide the public with reliable.., transporta-
tion") (case reversed because of erroneous legal conclusions concerning effect of
carrier's adherence to priority rules). For a discussion of a common carrier's duties,
see infra notes 15-69 and accompanying text.
17. 237 U.S. 121 (1915) (Puritan Coal Mining Co. brought action against Penn-
sylvania Railroad for damages caused by its failure to perform its duty under Penn-
sylvania law to furnish Puritan with its pro rata share of coal cars held for daily
distribution; plaintiff also alleged that defendant discriminated in favor of another
corporation).
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mon carriers treat passengers reasonably.' 8 A carrier must use a high
degree of care and prudence in all aspects of its operations. 19 Although
carriers need not insure their passengers' safety, they may not negli-
gently endanger them. 20 In Javeline v. Long Island Railroad,2' a New
York court held that the railroad owes its passengers the duty to
provide them with comfort and safety. 22
In the carriage contract, the carrier impliedly guarantees that the
vehicle is in sound and proper order and sufficient for the purpose for
which it is employed. 23 This guarantee imposes an obligation on the
carrier to use the proper equipment and maintain it in good condi-
tion. 24 The carriage contract also implies a duty of inspection. 25 Carri-
ers must use a high degree of skill and foresight to guard against the
possibility of accidents arising from the conditions of the road and the
machinery used in the transportation of the passengers. 26
The common law duty to provide secure carriage for transportation
extends to all of the carrier's equipment. 27 In Fendelman v. Conrail ,2s
18. Id. at 133. ("[t]he law exacts only what is reasonable from such carriers-
but, at the same time, requires that they should be equally reasonable in the treat-
ment of their patrons").
19. See LaSota, 421 Pa. at 388-89, 219 A.2d at 297 ("[a] common carrier for hire
owes to its passengers the highest degree of care and diligence in carrying them to
their destination and [in] enabling them to alight safely and to avoid any possible
danger while doing so") (citing Lyons v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 301 Pa. 499, 501, 152
A. 687, 688 (1930) (citations omitted); accord Palmer v. Delaware & Hudson Canal
Co., 120 N.Y. 170, 174-75, 24 N.E. 302, 304 (1890) (common carrier cannot meet
this duty without using utmost care and diligence which human foresight will allow).
20. See Griffith, 416 Pa. at 8, 203 A.2d at 799 (1964). See also Willis v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 34 N.Y. 670, 679 (1866) (carrier must "exercise the highest degree of
human foresight and skill to provide for the safety of [its] passengers").
21. 106 Misc. 2d 814, 435 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1981).
22. Id. at 816, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
23. See Kessel, 107 Misc. 2d at 1073, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 688 (by its contract of
carriage, railroad assumes obligation towards its passenger to transport him safely
and carefully to his destination).
24. Id. at 1076-77, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 690 (common carrier is required to provide
and use best machinery and appliances known and in general practical use); accord
Perkins v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 24 N.Y. 196, 219 (1862) ("[t]he defendants, as
common carriers of passengers, impliedly warrant . . . that their locomotives and
cars and all their appurtenances are constructed with the utmost care and skill and
are kept in sound and proper order").
25. See Javeline, 106 Misc. 2d at 818, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 515 (carrier has duty to
repair its equipment).
26. Id. at 816, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 514-15 (carrier must insure that its road and the
appliances used in operating it are and remain in good condition and free from
defects).
27. See Kessel, 107 Misc. 2d at 1074, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 688-89 (railroads have been
held liable for failures of their heating appliances; passengers should reasonably
expect benefits of many safety features built into vehicle).
28. 119 Misc. 2d 302, 464 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Civ. Ct. Westchester County 1983).
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a New York court held that a lack of electricity and water facilities
breaches the carriage contract.29 The carrier is liable for the harm
caused by its failure to furnish reasonable heat and air conditioning
when necessary for the comfort and safety of its passengers. 30
The common law standard of care requires carriers to use the
reasonable precautions which human judgment and foresight can
determine are necessary to make the passengers' journey safe and
comfortable.3 ' This standard extends to: maintaining its locomotives,
equipping its railroad with a sufficient number of safe cars, providing
its cars with safe and proper appliances and keeping its equipment in
good order and repair. 32 However, the carrier is not responsible for a
latent defect against which no degree of human skill could guard.3 3
The carrier is also duty-bound to carry the passenger to his destina-
tion without unreasonable delay or detention.3 4 The publication of a
timetable imposes the obligation to adhere to its schedule.35 In Becker
v. Conrail,3 6 a New York small claims court held that delayed trains
and errors in timetables violate the standard of performance a com-
29. Id. at 310, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
30. See Owen v. Rochester-Penfield Bus Co., 304 N.Y. 457, 461, 108 N.E. 2d
606, 608 (1952); accord Humphries v. Stokes Bus Line, 199 S.C. 132, 133, 18 S.E.2d
675, 676 (1942) (common law conferred right of action upon bus passenger who was
injured through defendant's failure to heat bus properly in cold weather).
31. See Scott v. Eastern AirLines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14, 20 (3d Cir. 1968) (law
requires common carrier to exercise highest degree of care that human judgment and
foresight are capable of, to make its passenger's journey safe) (quoting Doughty v.
Maine Cent. Transp. Co., 141 Me. 124, 129, 39 A.2d 758, 759, 157 A.L.R. 759, 761
(1944)); accord Kessel, 107 Misc. 2d at 1074, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 689 (heat has been
required of common carriers for long time; air conditioning is not new feature on
trains and other vehicles).
32. See J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS OF GOODS AND PASSEN-
cERs, By LAND AND BY WATER 500-05 (1972) (common carrier must warrant to public
that its carriage is "equal to the journey it undertakes"; similar warranty extends to
the condition of the road) (emphasis in original). See generally Kessel, 107 Misc. 2d
at 1077, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 690 (failure to secure necessary parts or changes will not be
rational defense to breach of contract claim); accord Javeline, 106 Misc. 2d at 816,
435 N.Y.S.2d at 514-15 (railroad must use vigilance to keep equipment free from
defects); D. MooRE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS 601-02 (1906) (appliances
include cars, wheels, axles, safety beams, brakes, seats and headlights).
33. See Javeline, 106 Misc. 2d at 816, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
34. See Becker v. Conrail, Westchester L. J., March 7, 1983, at 2, cols. 2-3 (New
Rochelle City Court, Westchester County, Feb. 28, 1983); Dominianni, 110 Misc. 2d
at 930, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 336 (trains must run at regular times).
35. See Becker, Westchester L. J., March 7, 1983, at 2, col. 3, 3, col. 1 (carrier
"failed to reasonably adhere to its published time schedules"). New York statutes
codify the common law duty of common carriers to start and run cars at regular
intervals. See N.Y. R.R. LAW § 54 (McKinney 1952 & Supp. 1983-1984).
36. Westchester L. J., March 7, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
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mon carrier owes to its passengers. 7 If the carrier breaches this duty,
it will be liable for usual and ordinary damages, but only for those
injuries which are attributable to the carrier's negligence. 38 A passen-
ger may also recover for the inconvenience and indignity which he
suffers during transportation.3 9
B. Statutorily Imposed Duties and Liabilities
The common law duties implied by the carriage contract remain
applicable today. New York codified many of these obligations in its
Public Service, Railroad and Transportation Laws. 40 These statutory
duties, however, are not regularly enforced. 4' Commuter railroads
continually breach the carriage contract through delays, cancellations
and equipment failures. 42
New York's Transportation Law43 requires every common carrier to
furnish safe and adequate service and facilities. 44 The means of trans-
37. Id. at 2, cols. 2-3.
38. See, e.g., Gerardy v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 52 Misc. 466, 467, 102
N.Y.S.2d 548, 549 (N.Y. App. Div. 1907) (publication of timetables creates legal
obligation to start trains on time; but only negligent failure to adhere to timetables
creates liablity); Becker, Westchester L. J., March 7, 1983, at 2, cols. 2-3.
39. See Owens v. Italia Societa Per Azione Navigazione-Genova, 70 Misc. 2d
719, 723, 334 N.Y.S.2d 789, 793 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) ("the law has evolved a
liberal rule of damages where a passenger has been subjected to humiliating indiffer-
ence and has been accorded treatment inferior to the class of treatment that he had
bargained for .... "; "the rule was invoked that where a shipowner fails to fully
perform, the passenger may recover . .. so much or all of the passage money
necessary for rendition of exact justice"). "[W]hen a passenger sues a carrier for a
breach of their agreement concerning accommodations, the 'inconveniences and
discomforts which a passenger suffers . . . are to be considered in the assessment of
the damages."' Odysseys Unlimited, Inc. v. Astral Travel Serv., 77 Misc. 2d 502, 505,
354 N.Y.S.2d 88, 91 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1974) (quoting N.Y. DAMAGES LAW §
624).
40. See infra notes 41-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of New York
law pertinent to the duties of common carriers. N.Y. TRANSP. LAW § 96 (McKinney
1975) codified the common law standard of care required of common carriers. This
statute also encompasses the duty to provide safe equipment and to make proper
repairs. N.Y. R.R. LAW § 62 (McKinney 1952 & Supp. 1983-1984) codifies the
common law duty to furnish a sufficient number of cars for commuters and the duty
to have a regular time schedule.
41. See supra notes 15-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of railroad
commuters asserting their rights. Such lawsuits have not forced the railroads to fulfill
their statutory and common law duties. See infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 3.
43. N.Y. TRANsP. LAW § 96 (McKinney 1975).
Every corporation, person or common carrier performing a service desig-
nated in the preceding section, shall furnish, with respect thereto, such
service and facilities as shall be safe and adequate and in all respects just
and reasonable. All charges made or demanded by any such corporation,
[Vol. XII
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portation must be reasonable in every respect. 45 Dominianni v. Con-
solidated Rail Corporation,46 a 1981 action for breach of contract,
held that New York's Transportation Law section 96 provides the
standards of service to which a passenger is entitled. 47 The Domi-
nianni court held that unreasonable filth, noxious odors, inadequate
heating and excessive crowding violate this standard of service and
constitute a breach of the carriage contract. 48
Reasonable and adequate service includes properly heating the
trains during the winter months and providing air conditioning or
open windows during the summer. Two recent cases, Javeline v. Long
Island Railroad49 and Kessel v. Long Island Railroad Company,50 held
that failure of the air conditioning equipment violated the carriage
contract between the commuters and the railroad. 51 Javeline52 held
that the commuter railroad has a duty to provide air conditioning in
cars with sealed windows. 53 New York's Transportation Law54 gives
the public service commissioner the power to enforce the standard
imposed by New York's Transportation Law section 96.55
New York's Railroad Law5 requires railroad companies to furnish a
sufficient number of cars for the reasonable accommodation of the
person or common carrier for the transportation of passengers or property
or for any service rendered or to be rendered in connection therewith shall
be just and reasonable and not more than allowed by law or by order of




46. 110 Misc. 2d 929, 443 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Civ. Ct. Westchester County 1981).
47. Id. at 930, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
48. Id. at 934-35, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
49. 106 Misc. 2d 814, 435 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1981).
50. 107 Misc. 2d 1067, 436 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Civ. Ct. Nassau County 1981).
51. 106 Misc. 2d at 818, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 515; 107 Misc. 2d at 1077, 436 N.Y.S.2d
at 690.
52. 106 Misc. 2d 814, 435 N.Y.S.2d 513.
53. 106 Misc. 2d at 818, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
54. N.Y. TanNsP. LAW § 115 (McKinney 1975).
55. See N.Y. TANsP. LAW § 115(2) (McKinney 1975).
The commission shall have the general supervision of all common carriers,
subject to its jurisdiction as hereinbefore defined, and shall have power to
and shall examine the same and keep informed as to their general condi-
tion ... and the manner in which their lines and property owned, leased,
controlled or operated, are managed, conducted and operated, not only
with respect to the adequacy, security and accommodations afforded by.
their service, but also with respect to their compliance with all provisions
of law, orders of the commission and charter requirements.
Id.
56. N.Y. R.R. LAW § 54 (McKinney 1952 & Supp. 1983-1984). "Every railroad
corporation shall start and run its cars for the transportation of passengers and
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traveling public.,7 This is a codification of the common law duty to
furnish passengers with seats .5 Becker v. Conrail59 held that shortages
of equipment violate the standard of performance which Conrail owes
to its passengers.6 0 Fendelman v. Conrail6 I held that a common carrier
is legally required to provide a sufficient number of cars for its passen-
gers. 2 Overcrowded trains lacking standing room clearly violate this
statutory duty.
New York's Transportation Law6 3 authorizes the Public Service
Commission to evaluate the practices, equipment, appliances and
services of all New York common carriers and set standards for
them. 4 The commission determines which of the carrier's services are
unreasonable, unsafe, improper or inadequate.6 5
If a common carrier fails to fulfill its obligations under the statutory
law or regulations promulgated by the public service commissioner, it
property at regular times, to be fixed by public notice, and shall furnish sufficient
accommodations for the transportation of all passengers ..... Id.
57. N.Y. R.R. LAW § 54 (McKinney 1952 & Supp. 1983-1984). See also Pennsyl-
vania R.R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U.S. 121, 133 (1915) (petitioner was
entitled to recover because "the carrier failed to comply with its common law
liability to furnish it with a proper number of cars"). Although the case concerns the
transportation of freight, the court refers to the common law duty which required
"the carrier to receive all goods and passengers." Id. The common law duty to have
an adequate number of carriages did not distinguish between carriers transporting
passengers and those carrying freight. See J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CARRIERS OF GOODS AND PASSENGERS, BY LAND AND BY WATER 122-24, 492-93 (1972).
58. See supra note 57.
59. Westchester L. J., March 7, 1983, at 1, col.1 (New Rochelle City Ct. West-
chester County Feb. 28, 1983).
60. Id. at 2, col. 3.
61. 119 Misc. 2d 302, 464 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Civ. Ct. Westchester County 1983).
62. Id. at 310, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
63. N.Y. TRANSP. LAW § 119(2) (McKinney 1975).
64. id..
Whenever the commission shall be of opinion . . . that the regulations,
practices, equipment, appliances, or service of any such common carrier
in respect to transportation of persons or property within the state are
unjust, unreasonable, unsafe, improper or inadequate, the commissioner
shall determine the just, reasonable, safe, adequate and proper regula-
tions, practices, equipment, appliances and service thereafter to be in
force, to be observed and to be used in such transportation of persons and
property and so fix and prescribe the same by order to be served upon
every common carrier to be bound thereby; and thereafter every common
carrier shall observe and obey each and every requirement of every such
order so served upon it, and to do everything necessary or proper in order
to secure absolute compliance with and observance of every such order by




will be liable for the resulting loss, damage or injury. 66 The Kessel
court listed the obligations of a commuter railroad: (1) to provide the
services it is capable of providing with the equipment it has pur-
chased; (2) to keep such equipment in working order; and (3) to secure
the necessary changes, modifications or spare parts for its equip-
ment.6 7 The Javeline court held that a common carrier must use
vigilance to ensure that its equipment remains in excellent condition
and free from defects. 8 Under New York Transportation Law section
111, the liability is the same for failure to perform a specific duty as it
is for performance of a forbidden act.69
C. Ineffectiveness of Individual Lawsuits
Although common law and statutory remedies are available to
commuters, 70 individual lawsuits have little or no deterrent effect on
the actions of common carriers.7' Only nominal damages have been
awarded 72 in commuter actions against railroad corporations for
equipment failures, unreasonable delays and dirty conditons. 3 Since
the monetary stake involved is small, commuters are discouraged from
66. N.Y. TRANSP. LAW § III (McKinney 1975).
In case a common carrier shall do, cause to be done or permit to be done
any act, matter or thing prohibited, forbidden or declared to be unlawful,
or shall omit to do any act, matter or thing required to be done, either by
law or by order of the commissioner, such common carrier shall be liable
to the persons or corporations affected thereby for all loss, damage or
injury caused thereby or resulting therefrom ....
Id. Although the statute does not state that common carriers will be held liable only
for negligent acts, it seems likely that the courts would interpret the statute as a
codification of the common law. Therefore, there would be no liability for non-
negligent acts. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
67. 107 Misc. 2d at 1076-77, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 690.
68. 106 Misc. 2d at 816, 435 N.Y.S.2d at 514-15.
69. N.Y. TRANSP. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1975).
70. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
71. See Giummo v. Citibank, N.A., 107 Misc. 2d 895, 898, 436 N.Y.S.2d 172,
174 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1981) (nuisance type suits are ineffective to change
management's practices) (quoting 119 CONG. REc. 25,419) (daily ed. July 23, 1973)
(statement of Sen. Hart)).
72. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 1-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the grievous
conditions existing on the railroads. At times, 26% of Metro-North's railroad cars
have been inoperative. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1982, at 54, col. 4. According to Long
Island Railroad's Assistant Chief Mechanical Officer in Charge of Operations, in the
summer of 1980, the railroad's air conditioning systems had a 55 to 65 % failure rate.
Kessel, 107 Misc. 2d at 1069, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
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utilizing their legal remedies. Therefore, railroad corporations are not
deterred from providing substandard service.74
Although passengers may recover damages for the discomfort and
inconvenience they suffer from a carrier's breach of contract, 75 recov-
eries ordinarily are limited to the passage price."M If aggravating cir-
cumstances exist, recoveries can be greater than the commutation
price.7 7 Additionally, the plaintiff has the burden of supplying the
basis for computing damages which are certain and not speculative.78
The difficulty plaintiffs have experienced in proving the actual
amount of damages79 discourages future litigants. The Fendelman
court8" noted that a "harried commuter" might not always seek mone-
tary relief, but merely better service.8 The court then noted that
remedies which go beyond a monetary judgment would be available
in a higher state court.82 However, individual actions for small dam-
74. See King v. Club Med, Inc., 76 A.D.2d 123, 430 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1st Dep't
1980) (class action against supplier of travel package alleged contract violations and
fraudulent misrepresentation; hotel had provided sporadic electricity, no air condi-
tioning and other substandard conditions). "[T]he damages that may have been
sustained by any single participant ... will almost certainly be insufficient to justify
the expenses inherent in any individual action .... " Id. at 128, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
Cf. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (individual suits are
impractical where claim of each prospective plaintiff is small). See also supra, note
71 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Odysseys Unlimited, Inc., v. Astral Travel Service, 77 Misc.2d 502,
505-06, 354 N.Y.S.2d 88, 91-92 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1974) ("[d]amages arising
from a breach of the contract to carry, which results in inconvenience and indignity
to the passenger while in transit, are not limited to the price of passage") (quoting
Ligante v. Panama R.R. Co., 147 App. Div. 97, 99-100 (2d Dep't 1911)); Campbell
v. Pullman Co., 182 App. Div. 931, 931 (2d Dep't 1918)) (passenger's discomfort and
inconvenience resulting from breach was within contemplation of parties and so a
proper element of damages).
76. Dominianni, 110 Misc. 2d at 935, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 339 (commuter ordinarily
will not be able to receive damage award greater than passage money in absence of
special circumstances).
77. Id.
78. See Kessel, 107 Misc. 2d at 1077, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 690; accord Fendelrnan,
119 Misc. 2d at 311-12, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 329.
79. See Fendelman, 119 Misc. 2d at 312, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 330 (plaintiff's compu-
tation of damages was disallowed by court because it was based on speculation;
however, "[t]his does not mean that the plaintiff did not sustain any damages but
only that they have not been proven to the satisfaction of the court under what it
understands are the binding principles of substantive law").
80. 119 Misc. 2d 302, 464 N.Y.S.2d 323.
81. Id. at 312-13, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
82. Id.
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ages do not permit access to those courts. 83 Another procedural device
is therefore necessary.
III. Availability of the Class Action as a Procedural Device
A. The Class Action Device: New York Law and Federal Influence
Accessibility to the class action device in state courts is crucial to the
assertion of consumer, and therefore commuter, claims. The United
States Supreme Court, in Snyder v. Harris,84 held that the claims of
the individual class members may not be aggregated to reach the
requisite amount in controversy.8 5 In Zahn v. International Paper
Co. ,86 the Court foreclosed the possibility of allowing a class action to
proceed unless each member alleged a claim that satisfied the $10,000
amount in controversy." By requiring each class member to meet the
requisite amount in controversy and prohibiting aggregation of
claims, these two cases completely prevent access to the federal courts
through the use of commuter class actions. The class members' indi-
vidual claims are simply too small.
In 1975, the New York legislature enacted a new class action stat-
ute, Article 9 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), 88 which
repealed CPLR section 1005.89 The changes in the class action statute
83. Id.
84. 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (Court considered only issue of whether separate and
distinct claims presented by and for various claimants in class action may be added
together to provide minimum $10,000 jurisdictional amount in controversy).
85. Id. at 336.
86. 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (petitioners brought class action against respondent to
recover damages for pollution of Lake Champlain from discharges of respondent's
pulp and paper-making plant).
87. Id. at 301. Federal courts will have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where there is diversity of citizenship and "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $10,000 .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
88. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW art. 9 (McKinney 1976).
89. 1962 N.Y. LAW ch.318 § 4 (effective Sept. 1, 1963, repealed 1975). Under the
old law, a plaintiff could qualify for class status only in three specific situations: (1) if
the subject matter of the controversy was a limited fund or specific property; (2) if
the satisfaction of the individual claims before the court automatically satisfied the
claims of all the other class members; or (3) if a bond of "privity" existed among the
multiple parties forming the class. See NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL CONF., REPORT TO
THE 1974 LEGISLATURE IN RELATION TO THE CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES AND
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 229 OF THE JUDICIARY LAW
194, 205 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1974 REPORT]. The class action, under the old
law, was confined to the closely associated relationships growing out of trusts,
partnerships, or joint ventures. Id. Under CPLR Section 1005, the New York courts
would not countenance a class action for separate and distinct relief for individual
19841
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were intended to achieve two major goals: (1) to establish a flexible,
functional scheme whereby class actions could be certified without the
undesirable and socially detrimental restrictions that occurred under
the old statute,90 and (2) to prescribe basic guidelines for judicial
management of class actions.9' Article 9 was a legislative attempt to
provide a practical procedural device for those whose rights could not
be vindicated without a class action. 92
New York courts have contravened the legislative purposes of Arti-
cle 9 by narrowly interpreting the statute. The New York State legisla-
ture enacted Article 9 because CPLR section 1005 did not accommo-
date the pressing need for an effective, practical and flexible group
remedy in areas of social concern.93 Although the substantive law in
these areas was adequate, no efficient procedural device existed when
individual relief and joinder of the class were neither economically
nor administratively feasible.9 4 "[C]lass action status has been denied
in 75 percent of the reported cases construing article 9 since its enact-
ment in 1975 . . . . [A]nalysis of the cases indicates a continuing
tendency toward narrow construction of the statute. The Court of
Appeals has not yet revealed its own attitude on the subject. '95 The
New York courts should broaden their interpretation of CPLR Article
9 to accomplish the intended legislative purpose.
The basic feature of the amended law is the abandonment of the
privity requirement.96 Instead of the amorphous privity concept,
functional criteria that consider the expense of individual litigation
and the unequal balance of power between individuals and large
members of the class, in the absence of a limited fund or substantive relationship
among class members. See Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 400,
311 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282, 259 N.E.2d 720, 721 (1970).
90. 1974 REPORT, supra note 89, at 205. For a discussion of the undesirable
restrictions under CPLR Section 1005, see supra note 85 and infra notes 92 and 94.
91. Id.
92. N.Y. STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 9, 10 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as 1975 LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL].
93. Id. at 10-11. For a list of the areas of social concern, see infra note 94 and
accompanying text.
94. Id. See Friar v. Vanguard Holding Corp., 78 A.D.2d 83, 434 N.Y.S.2d 698
(2d Dep't 1980). The criteria of CPLR section 901 should be broadly construed
because it is apparent that the legislature intended Article 9 to be a liberal substitute
for the narrow class action statute which preceded it. Id at 91, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
95. Id. at 92-93, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 704-05 (footnote omitted). "[l]t is apparent that
the State's palpable tilt away from the broad use of the remedy has been significantly
influenced by narrow interpretations of article 9." Id. at 95, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 706
(citations omitted).
96. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw art. 9 at 319 (comment) (McKinney 1976). See 1974
REPORT, supra note 89, at 206.
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corporations were substituted by the legislature.9 7 At the same time,
Article 9 assures adequate judicial control of the class action. 98 The
former requirement that there be a substantial relationship among the
class members prevented the use of class actions as a device to remedy
violations of consumer rights. 9 CPLR Article 9 added a major
weapon to the consumer protection arsenal. 00 The revised law creates
a pragmatic, functional test to determine on a case by case basis
whether the prospective class is more united by a mutual interest in
the settlement of common questions than it is divided by the individ-
ual members' interests in matters peculiar to them.' 0 '
In enacting Article 9, the New York legislature adopted Federal
Rule 23102 with some changes aimed at simplifying the structure and
97. Id. CPLR section 1005(a) provided: "Where the question is one of a common
or general interest of many persons or where the persons who might be made parties
are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court,
one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all." 1962 N.Y. LAWS ch.318, § 4,
(effective Sept. 1, 1963, repealed 1975). Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 276
N.Y. 230, 237-38, 11 N.E.2d 890, 893 (1937) was the "leading authority" for the
proposition that "there is no community interest where the substantive law affords
the members of the class a choice of remedies for in such a case no one member has
the right to select which remedy the class will pursue." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 901,
at 323 (comment) (McKinney 1976). Hall v. Coburn Corp. of Am., 26 N.Y.2d 396,
401, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281, 283, 259 N.E.2d 720, 721 (1970), held that there had to be an
identical interest among the members of the class. Pre-1975 cases held that a class
action would not lie for fraud; currently, if the question of fraud lies at the heart of
the class action and clearly predominates over the uncommon questions, such as
reliance and damages, a class action will be allowed. See Guadagno v. Diamond
Tours & Travel, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 697, 698-99, 392 N.Y.S.2d 783, 784-85 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1976).
98. See 1974 REPORT, supra note 89, at 206.
99. 1974 REPORT, supra note 89, at 205. CPLR section 1005 also precluded the
class action device from being used in suits concerning environmental offenses, civil
rights, and the execution of adhesion contracts. Id. See Guadagno, 89 Misc. 2d at
699, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 785 ("manifest legislative purpose [was] to expand the utiliza-
tion of the class action device to encompass modern claims for relief, such as claims
associated with the violation of consumer rights . . .").
100. See supra note 12. Cf. Goldman v. Garofalo, 96 Misc. 2d 790, 796, 409
N.Y.S.2d 684, 687 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1978), modified, 71 A.D.2d 650 (1979),
aff'd, 50 N.Y.2d 851 (1980) (action by consumers against unlicensed laboratory was
to vindicate public good). The purpose of the litigation is to discourage a supplier of
consumer services from violating the law in the future. Id. at 796, 409 N.Y.S.2d at
687.
101. See, e.g., Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 827, 832-33, 394
N.Y.S.2d 341, 345-46 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 60
A.D.2d 501, 401 N.Y.S.2d 233 (2d Dep't 1978) (court reversed because it found that
individual questions of reliance predominated over common questions). See generally
2 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE § 901.08 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as WEINSTEIN].
102. FED. R. CIv. P. 23. Federal Rule 23 was amended in 1966. The amended
Federal Rule describes in practical terms the occasions for maintaining class actions.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XII
overcoming the limitation imposed upon the Federal Rule, particu-
larly concerning notice. 103 CPLR Article 9 grants the court the discre-
tion to direct notice to each member of the class so that he or she may
request exclusion from the class within a specified time after notifica-
tion.° 4 Instead of the complex federal scheme of classification, CPLR
section 901 provides a unitary system of prerequisites which is applica-
ble to all class actions. 10 Since the New York statute is so similar to
Federal Rule 23, New York courts look to interpretations of the fed-
eral rule for guidance in decisions implementing Article 9 of the
CPLR. 106
The policies behind Federal Rule 23 favor maintenance of class
actions and encourage a liberal interpretation of the Rule. 0 7 These
policies are particularly strong in situations where denial of the class
action application will effectively terminate further litigation.10 8 The
Subdivision (a) states four prerequisites for maintaining any class action: (1) class
must be so numerous as to make joinder impracticable; (2) existence of common
questions of law or fact must exist; (3) the representatives' claims must be typical of
the entire class; and (4) representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the
class' interests. In addition to these requirements, subdivision (b) describes three
situations in which a class action may be maintained. The first situation allows a class
action if individual suits might establish incompatible standards to govern the oppos-
ing party's conduct or if judgment in a nonclass action would be dispositive of the
rights of other members. The second situation occurs when final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole is appropriate.
The last situation occurs when the class action is superior to the other available
means of adjudication of the controversy. Id.
103. See infra note 106 and accompanying text for explanation of the relationship
between CPLR Article 9 and Federal Rule 23. The Supreme Court held: "Individual
notice must be sent to all class members whose names and addresses may be ascer-
tained through reasonable effort." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173
(1974). "[This] is not a discretionary consideration to be waived in a particular case."
Id. at 176. "The usual rule is that a plaintiff must initially bear the cost of notice to
the class." Id. at 178; accord Stern v. Carter, 97 Misc. 2d 775, 412 N.Y.S.2d 333
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1979). CPLR section 904 is more liberal than Federal Rule 23
in regard to the expenses of notification. It allows the court to allocate part or all of
the expense to defendant. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 904; Stern, 97 Misc. 2d at 777,
412 N.Y.S.2d at 335. Federal Rule 23(c)(2) states that the court shall direct to the
member of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.
104. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 904 (McKinney 1976). Sections 904(a) and (b) do not
mandate that individual notice be given to all the identifiable members. The court
has discretion to decide the method of notice most appropriate to the specific class
action. Id.
105. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 901 (McKinney 1976). See infra note 126 for the
prerequisites of New York's unitary system.
106. See, e.g., Stern, 97 Misc. 2d at 778, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 335-36. Federal inter-
pretations of the prerequisites will be used when necessary to explain CPLR article 9.
107. Friar, 78 A.D.2d at 93, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
108. ld. "The rationale for the expansive Federal attitude lies in two distinct
theories-'therapeutic benefits' . . . and due process." Id. at 94, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 705
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United States Supreme Court noted, in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Com-
pany of California,10 9 that Federal Rule 23 "enhances the efficacy of
private actions by permitting citizens to combine their limited re-
sources to achieve a more powerful litigation posture." 10 Essentially
the same policy supports the New York statute; CPLR Article 9 en-
ables individuals injured by a similar pattern of conduct to pool their
resources and collectively seek relief."'
One of the results of using Federal Rule 23 is to bind all those found
to be members of the class at the time of judgment. This rule applies
whether or not the judgment is favorable to the class." 2 To achieve
this result, the New York legislature created several prerequisites un-
der CPLR section 901 which refer to the adequacy of the class repre-
sentative and his individual claim.1 3
(citations omitted). For a discussion of therapeutic benefits, see supra notes 96-98 and
accompanying text. "The due process view is founded on the notion that the class
action mechanism affords many individuals a quasi-constitutional right to litigate-
to participate meaningfully in the legal process-which they otherwise would not
have." Id. at 94-95, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
109. 405 U.S. 251 (1972). Hawaii alleged that respondents violated the Sherman
Act by entering into unlawful contracts and by monopolizing the petroleum products
industry. Hawaii sought to recover damages as the representative of all purchasers in
Hawaii for identical overcharges. Id. at 253.
110. Id. at 266.
111. See Gilman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 93 Misc. 2d 941,
947, 404 N.Y.S.2d 258, 264 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978) (greater conservation of
judicial effort results when common questions of law or fact affecting class members
are litigated in one forum).
112. See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853) (class action by
traveling preachers to recover their portion of a fund). The Court held: "For conven-
ience, therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits a
portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire body, and the decree binds all
of them the same as if all were before the court." Id. at 302. The Court reaffirmed
this decision in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921) (class
action brought by fraternal benefit association to determine rights of its members in
trust fund) and Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) (five hundred property
owners wanted to bring class action to enforce restrictive covenant). Federal Rule 23
provides that all class actions maintained to the end as such will result in judgments
binding on all those whom the court finds'to be members of the class, whether or not
the judgment is favorable to the class. Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D.
69, 99 (1966) (Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States and Advisory
Committee Notes).
113. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 901(a)(3),(4) (McKinney 1976). See also Summers
v. Wyman, 64 Misc. 2d 67, 314 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970)
(petitioner sought class action status to compel Nassau County Commissioner of
Social Services to withhold from monthly assistance grant sufficient funds to pay
electricity bills; class status was denied). "Class actions are to be approached warily
since by nature they deprive 'nonappearing parties, bound by the plaintiff [sic]
position, of their separate personal day in court, as well as their choice of remedy."
Id. at 71, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
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B. Advantages and Disadvantages of New York's Class Action
Statute
Article 9's advantages fall into three categories: economic, psycho-
logical and procedural." 4 From an economic viewpoint, a combina-
tion of small claims creates the possibility of a substantial recovery,
which might encourage an attorney to represent plaintiffs whose
claims would otherwise go unresolved."15 If a class action is not al-
lowed where individual claims are small, the litigation probably will
not proceed."16 Courts have held that the class action is particularly
appropriate where many consumers have been injured." 7 Refusal to
certify a class action in this situation would be tantamount to denying
relief, not only to the plaintiff, but to all class members as well." 8
A plaintiff also receives a psychological advantage when appearing
in court as the representative of a numerous class." 9 Even if the court
is not impressed by the size of the class, such an action might result in
creating public or political sympathy for the class. ' 2 0 The possibility of
114. WEINSTEIN, supra note 101, § 901.06. For a discussion of the advantages of a
class action, see inJra notes 115-25.
115. See Gonsalves v. Roma Furniture Co., Inc., 107 Misc. 2d 186, 188 n.2, 443
N.Y.S.2d 559, 561 n.2 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1980) (disallowance of class action
would deny any real possibility of being made whole to those claimants whose
damages are for sums too small to warrant an attorney's taking the case). See
WEINSTEIN, supra note 101, § 901.06.
116. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (petitioner
brought class action on behalf of all buyers and sellers of odd lots on New York Stock
Exchange and alleged that respondents set excessive differentials on purchase price).
"A critical fact in this litigation is that petitioner's individual stake in the damages
award he seeks is only $70. No competent attorney would undertake this complex..
. action to recover so inconsequential an amount. Economic reality dictates that
petitioner's suit proceed as a class action or not at all." Id.
117. See Goldman, 96 Misc. 2d at 794, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 686 ("class action is
particularly appropriate where a large number of persons has been injured but not
sufficiently for them as individuals to commence individual actions"). See also Pro-
posed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 100 (1966) ("[t]he difficulties which
would be likely to arise if resort were had to separate actions by or against the
individual members of the class here furnish the reasons for, and the principal key to,
the propriety and value of utilizing the class-action device").
118. Friar, 78 A.D.2d at 93, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 705 (legislative policy favors mainte-
nance of class actions; this policy is especially strong where denial of class action
device would effectively terminate other litigation).
119. See generally WEINSTEIN, supra note 101, § 901.06.
120. See Friar, 78 A.D.2d at 94, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 705 (class action against mort-
gage lender). The theraupeutic benefits of the class action device are premised on the
concept of collateral benefits which flow from the use of this device. Id. One benefit
is the prevention of "legalized theft" by wealthy institutions. Id. at 94, 434 N.Y.S.2d
at 706 (citing Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d. Cir. 1965);
Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 88-90 (7th Cir. 1941)).
856 [Vol. XlI
1984] RAILROAD CLASS ACTIONS
a class action may be a powerful deterrent to a defendant in cases
where an individual plaintiff would have no effect on defendant's
behavior. 21 The class action device is designed to allow a person to act
in his own interests to achieve justice and procedural efficiency in
mass litigation. 122 It benefits both the representative plaintiff and all
the members of the class. This procedural device relies on private
initiative to vindicate public rights. 123
Procedurally, the most important advantage is the tolling of the
statute of limitations for all class members when the plaintiff brings
the class action, even if the application for class certification is de-
nied. 124 In some cases, the burden of proof may be simpler because
evidence involving non-parties becomes relevant. 25
121. Friar, 78 A.D.2d at 94, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
The class action is seen as a means of inducing socially and ethically
responsible behavior on the part of large and wealthy institutions, which
will be deterred from carrying out policies or engaging in activities harm-
ful to large numbers of individuals. Absent the class action lawsuit, the
theory goes, these institutions will be permitted to operate virtually un-
checked and continue to engage in 'legalized theft' which is perpetuated
because the injured potential plaintiffs frequently are damaged in a small
sum (often less than $100) since, realistically speaking, our legal system
inhibits the bringing of suits based upon small claims.
Id.
122. Cf. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank of Jackson, Mississippi v. Roper, 445 U.S.
326 (1980) (respondents held credit cards issued by petitioner and alleged, in class
action, that petitioner made usurious finance charges against respondents' accounts).
We begin by identifying the interests to be considered . . . in the class-
action context. First is the interest of the named plaintiffs: their personal
stake in the substantive controversy and their related right as litigants in a
federal court to pursue ... their individual interests, is the responsibility
of named plaintiffs to represent the collective interests of the putative
class.
Id. at 331. See generally Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest in the
United States of America, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 343 (1974).
123. Cannon v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 106 Misc. 2d
1060, 433 N.Y.S.2d 378 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1980), modified, 87 A.D.2d 403,
451 N.Y.S.2d 817 (2d Dep't 1980) (court certified class consisting of discharged and
demoted employees of defendant; class alleged that defendant engaged in discrimina-
tory employment practices). The class action is also a means of vindicating the rights
of absent members who are unable to personally prosecute claims. Id. at 1064, 1068,
433 N.Y.S.2d at 383, 385 ("[s]ince the interests of all class members coincide with
respect to the merits of this suit, then, in advocating their own interests, the named
parties will necessarily represent the interests of absentees as well") (citing United
States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 682 (D.D.C. 1977).
124. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1973). This
rule is necessary to "insure effectuation of the purposes of litigative efficiency and
economy that [Federal Rule 23 of Civil Procedure] was designed to serve." Id. at 555-
56.
125. WEINSTEIN, supra note 101, § 901.06. For example, in a commuter class
action, evidence of the substandard performance on a certain train line might be
admissible even if the representative never traveled on it.
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Of course, there are also disadvantages to the class action device.
First, the court will have greater supervision over the suit.1 26 Sec-
ondly, the class representative's freedom to settle the litigation is
limited because of his fiduciary duty to the other class members. 27
Thirdly, individual class members who do not withdraw are deprived
of their day in court. 28 Finally, the notice requirement may increase
the costs of litigation and create excessive paper work if the court
demands individual notice to all members. 29
C. The Prerequisites for Establishing a New York Class Action
New York's class action statute establishes a unified set of five
prerequisites before a class action may be certified. 130 CPLR section
126. See Rochester v. Chiarella, 86 A.D.2d 110, 116, 449 N.Y.S.2d 112, 115 (4th
Dep't), afJ'd, 58 N.Y.2d 316 (1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 102 (1983) ("[t]he court
in a class action has broad powers to control the course of the litigation"). See also
N.Y Civ. PRAC. LAW § 907 (McKinney 1976).
In the conduct of class actions the court may make appropriate orders: (1)
determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent
undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argu-
ment; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class, or
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such
manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step
in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportu-
nity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair
and adequate, or to appear and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to
come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties
or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to elimi-
nate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that
the action proceed accordingly; (5) directing that a money judgment
favorable to the class be paid either in one sum, whether forthwith or
within such period as the court may fix, or in such installments as the court
may specify; (6) dealing with similar procedural matters.
id.
127. Stern v. Carter, 97 Misc. 2d 775, 778, 412 N.Y.S.2d 333, 336 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1979), modified, 82 A.D.2d 321, 441 N.Y.S.2d 717 (2d Dep't 1981) ("a
representative has a fiduciary responsibility to see that the other class members
relying on him are properly represented") (citing Vallone v. Delpark Equities, Inc.,
95 Misc. 2d 161, 168, 407 N.Y.S.2d 121, 126 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978)). See also
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 908 (McKinney 1976) ("class action shall not be dismissed,
discontinued, or compromised without the approval of the court").
128. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
129. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 101, § 901.06.
130. CPLR section 901(a) lists five prerequisites for the class action: (1) class must
be so numerous that joinder of all the members is impracticable; (2) common
questions of law or fact must predominate over those affecting individual members
only; (3) claims of the representative parties must be typical of the entire class, (4)
representatives must adequately and fairly represent interests of class; and (5) the
class action must be superior to the other available means of adjudication of the
controversy. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 901(a) (McKinney 1976). Federal Rule 23 does
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902 lists the factors which the court will consider before determining
the propriety of maintaining the suit as a class action.' 31 Under CPLR
section 901, Article 9's first prerequisite requires that the class be so
numerous that joinder of all the members, whether required or per-
mitted, is impracticable. 32 The factors to consider include the num-
ber in the class, the residences of the class members and the economic
reality of joining all the members. 33 Courts have certified class
actions on behalf of as few as eighteen class members. 34 However,
problems of manageability arise when the class becomes too numer-
ous.135 The purpose of preclass certification discovery 36 is to ascertain
not require this last prerequisite. However, Federal Rule 23(b)(3) lists such a situa-
tion as being appropriate for maintaining a class action. See supra note 102.
131. These factors are: (1) the interest of class members in individually litigating
the action; (2) the impracticality of prosecuting separate actions; (3) the extent of any
pertinent litigation already commenced by class members; (4) the desirability of
concentrating litigation of claim in the particular forum; and (5) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §
902 (McKinney 1976).
132. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 901, at 325 (comment) (McKinney 1976). See also
Strauss, 89 Misc. 2d at 830-31, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 344. The numerosity prerequisite
does not include a requirement that the exact number of members in the proposed
class be made known to the court at the outset of the litigation. Id.
133. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 101, § 901.07. The Appellate Division, First
Department has said in dicta that class actions under CPLR Article 9 should be
limited to New York residents. See Reis v. Club Med, Inc., 81 A.D.2d 793, 439
N.Y.S.2d 127 (1st Dep't 1981), appeal dismissed, 54 N.Y.2d 753 (1981); Bloom v.
Cunard Line, Ltd., 76 A.D.2d 237, 430 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1st Dep't 1980); Simon v.
Cunard Line, Ltd., 75 A.D.2d 283, 428 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1st Dep't 1980); Tanzer v.
Turbodyne Corp., 68 A.D.2d 614, 417 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1st Dep't 1979); Gottlieb v.
March Shipping Passenger Services, Inc., 67 A.D.2d 379, 413 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1st
Dep't 1979). In an action against Long Island Railroad, only New York residents
would be involved. If the existence of Connecticut residents in a commuter class
action against Metro-North would pose problems, the class could be limited to only
New York residents.
134. See Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 375
F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1967). See also Cannon, 106 Misc. 2d at 1065, 433 N.Y.S.2d
at 383 ("the trend has been to regard classes of approximately thirty or less as not
being sufficiently numerous, although there are exceptions . . .") (quoting Harriss v.
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 24, 45 (N.D. Cal. 1977)).
135. See Gilman, 93 Misc. 2d at 948-49, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 265. "Manageability
should not be equated with sheer numbers. Rather, it should be considered together
with the definition of the class and notice. Proper notice should breed efficient
management." Id. (footnote omitted).
136. Preclass certification discovery is an exchange of information which takes
place before the court certifies the suit as a class action. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc.
v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 356-57 (1978) (respondents brought action to recover
amount they paid for shares in petitioner's fund). The court, in its discretion, may
order the defendant to perform a task necessary to identify the class members. For
example, the court may order the defendant to specify or turn over certain business
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the size of the group that allegedly shares plaintiff's grievance, not to
plant the seed of litigation in the minds of those who previously had
given no indication that they wanted to sue. 117
The second prerequisite of Article 9 requires that common questions
of law or fact must predominate over any issues affecting only individ-
ual members. 3 As stated above, the test under CPLR section 901(a)'s
predecessor mandated that class members possess a substantive unity
of interest. Under the amended law, the court need only determine
whether the class seeks to remedy a common legal grievance.139 If the
defendant is alleged to have acted against the plaintiffs under a com-
mon scheme or single plan, it is usually a sufficient basis for finding
that a class action is appropriate. 40 The common questions must be
the focus of the lawsuit and not merely tangential issues. ' 4' This latter
requirement seeks to allow a class to achieve economies of time, effort,
and expense and to promote uniform decisions for persons similarly
situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about
other undesirable results. 4
2
The third prerequisite of Article 9 requires that the claims of the
representative parties must be typical of the claims of all the class
records that list class members' names. Id. "Since petitioners apparently have the
right to control these records, and since the class members can be identified only by
reference to them, the . . . Court acted within its authority under [Federal] Rule
23(d) in ordering petitioners to make . . . the records available to respondents." Id.
at 359.
137. Smith v. Atlas Int'l Tours, 80 A.D.2d 762, 764 (1st Dep't 1981) (mem.).
138. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 901(a)(2) (McKinney 1976).
139. See Vickers v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'ns of East Rochester, 87 Misc. 2d
880, 887, 386 N.Y.S.2d 291, 296 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1976), modified 56
A.D.2d 62, 390 N.Y.S.2d 749 (4th Dep't 1977) (in action against defendant for
violation of Consumer Credit Act, all persons who received loans from defendant
were granted class status under New York law). Now the test is whether predominant
questions exist rather than the more restrictive test of substantive unity. Id.
140. Cf. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Cases
have permitted class actions where there is a common course of conduct which is said
to predominate. The existence of individual questions will not defeat the granting of
class status. Id. If in later stages of the action, the grievances are varied and differ as
to each member of the class, the court can determine that the action should not
proceed on a class basis. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 902 (McKinney 1976).
141. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 901 at 325 (comment to § 901(3)) (McKinney 1976).
Cf. City of Philadelphia v. Emhart Corp., 50 F.R.D. 232, 235 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(requisite preliminary showing should be minimal demonstration that complaint is
sincere and aggregate group claim is substantial or demonstration that claim put
forth on behalf of class is more than frivolous or speculative) (citing 3B MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 23.45[3]).
142. Friar, 78 A.D.2d at 97, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 707. Class actions protect the
defendant from the risk that varying adjudications in individual lawsuits with mem-
bers of a class might establish incompatible standards to govern defendant's behav-
ior. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
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members. 143 It is essential that the absent class members be properly
represented, 44 because each class member who does not withdraw
will be bound by the res judicata effect of the judgment. 45 CPLR
section 903146 empowers the court to include in the class all those who
do not affirmatively take steps to be excluded.147 If class members are
given the opportunity to withdraw from the class action and do not
use it, they will be bound by the judgment. The representative must
have an individual cause of action and his interests must be closely
identified with the interests of all the other members of the class. 148 A
properly chosen representative can offer more to the prosecution of
the class action than the mere fulfillment of the procedural require-
ments. 141
The fourth prerequisite for class status mandates that the represent-
ative parties be capable of fairly and adequately protecting the inter-
ests of all class members.150 The court seeks to determine whether or
not the representatives will vigorously and effectively pursue the
suit. 1 ' In addition, the court must determine whether or not the
143. See N.Y. Civ. PriAc. LAW § 901(a)(3) (McKinney 1976).
144. See Tanzer v. Turbodyne Corp., 68 A.D.2d 614, 417 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1st Dep't
1979) (class status was denied to stockholders because proposed representatives were
relatives of class' lawyer and regularly made small investments in order to bring
lawsuits on behalf of other stockholders).
145. Id. at 620, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 709 ("[c]lass actions are to result in judgments
which will bind or inure to the benefit of many persons who have not expressly
authorized suit on their behalf"). See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
146. NEW YORK CIV. PRAC. LAW § 903 (McKinney 1976)
147. Id.
148. See Gilman, 93 Misc. 2d at 945, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 262 (these requirements are
"essence" of prerequisite of typicality); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3); WEINSTEIN, supra
note 101, § 901.09. If a plaintiff who brings the case has a doubtful cause of action,
the court should order joinder of other members or dismiss the class action feature of
the suit. See Stern, 97 Misc. 2d at 780, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
149. Stern, 97 Misc. 2d at 780, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 337 (citing Goldchip Funding Co.
v. 20th Century Corp., 61 F.R.D. 592, 594 (N.D. Pa. 1974)). Accord Pettway v. Am.
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1177-78 (5th Cir. 1978) (representative plays
major role in prosecution of class action; he has duty to appeal lower court judgment
and to decide whether to settle).
150. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 901(a)(4) (McKinney 1976). This prerequisite
derives from Federal Rule 23(a)(4); it is a due process requirement. See WEINSTEIN,
supra note 101, § 901.15.
151. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th
Cir. 1969). The plaintiff cannot bring the action solely to satisfy his particular claim.
The court must determine that the litigants are not involved in a collusive suit. Id.
(citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968)). See also Vickers,
56 A.D.2d at 65, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 749. Federal cases hold that "the fact that the
named plaintiffs seek damages in different amounts or even a remedy of a different
character will not impair their ability fairly to represent the class. If at any stage of
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representative has a substantial interest that is antagonistic to or
conflicts with those of the other class members.152 In conjunction with
this requirement, the court also considers the class' counsel's compe-
tence.1 53 New York courts will deny class action status or decertify a
class when counsel's conduct is found to be champertous.154
The final prerequisite of CPLR section 901 is that the court find the
class action device to be superior to the other available methods of
adjudication. 55 The class representatives must show that the class suit
is the best method of vindicating the rights of the class members. 56
The court must then evaluate all the alternatives to the class action. 57
The existence of difficulties in managing the litigation due to an
excessively large class should not result in denial of class status where
the only likely alternative to the class action would be denial of any
relief. 58 Federal courts generally hold that if all the other prerequi-
the action a question should arise as to the adequacy of the class representation, the
trial court can at that stage take appropriate action." Id. (cita ..ons omitted).
152. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (existence of antagonistic interests
denied protection to absent class members); accord Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18
N.Y. 2d 526, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1966).
153. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 101, § 901.10 ("qualifications of the attorney for
the class are also considered of essential importance in determining the adequacy of
the representation").
154. Stern, 97 Misc. 2d at 780, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 336 (court gives example of lawyer
who attempted to stir up litigation and thereby prejudiced interests of class). Cham-
pertous describes a lawyer who provides money and services for the suit in consider-
ation of his receiving a share of the recovery. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 209 (rev. 5th
ed. 1979).
155. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 901(a)(5) (McKinney 1976).
156. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 101, § 901.19 (proponent must always convince
court that article 9 is applicable to situation and that class action is 'appropriate mode
of adjudication). The "best method" means that the class action would achieve
economies of time, effort and expense. Id.
157. See Friar, 78 A.D.2d at 99, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 708. The superiority require-
ment has been interpreted by federal courts as requiring the court to examine other
adjudicative possibilities and compare them to the class action. See Dolgow, 43
F.R.D. at 482; accord Kaufman v. Lawrence, 76 F.R.D. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (class
action sought on behalf of common stock holders was allowed because, under cir-
cumstances, it was "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy").
158. See Friar, 78 A.D.2d at 95, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 706 ("by construing the avail-
ability of class action relief narrowly, the judiciary is seen as denying access to the
courts to thousands of individuals whose minimal damages are greatly outweighed by
the prohibitive costs involved in prosecuting a lawsuit against a wealthy opponent");
Gilman, 93 Misc. 2d at 948, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 264 ("maximum damages recoverable
by any single plaintiff would be at most . . .hardly enough . . . to conduct to
completion the protracted and complicated litigation required to establish his
claim").
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sites have been met, the class action is the most effective means of
proceeding. 59
D. Applicability of New York's Class Action Device to Commuter
Litigation
1. Fulfilling the Five New York Prerequisites
In 1980, New York amended its Consumer Protection Act to create
a private right of action for injuries caused by deceptive acts and
practices. 0 Generally, the small amount of damages involved in most
consumer fraud cases inhibits consumers from utilizing these statutes
to bring their own actions."16 To ease the consumer's burden of indi-
vidual litigation, the Consumer Protection Board can assist consumers
with class actions when sellers do not maintain high standards of
honesty and fair business practices. 6 2 The New York legislature en-
acted CPLR Article 9 "to facilitate collective recovery for individuals
whose claims are too small to justify the efforts and costs of litiga-
tion. 1' 6 3 The class action device has been used in other consumer
159. See, e.g., Richardson v. Coopers & Lybrand, 82 F.R.D. 335, 348-50
(D.D.C. 1978) (substantial number of claimants and predominance of common
questions make class action "superior mode of conducting . . .suits"); In re Sugar
Ind. Antitrust Litigation, 73 F.R.D. 322, 357-58 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (given size of class
and pervasiveness of common allegations, class action device is superior method of
proceeding); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 36, 42 (S.D.N.Y 1975) (case
could most effectively be conducted as class action under Federal Rule 23 since there
were numerous plaintiffs with small claims based upon predominating common
questions).
160. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h), 350-d(3) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). Sec-
tion 349(h) provides:
In addition to the right of action granted to the attorney general pursuant
to this section, any person who has been injured by reason of any violation
of this section may bring an action in his own name to enjoin such
unlawful act or practice and to recover his actual damages or fifty dollars,
whichever is greater.
Id.
161. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 185 (1974).
[I]n our society that is growing in complexity there are bound to be
innumerable people in common disasters, calamities, or ventures who
would go begging for justice without the class action but who could with
all regard to due process be protected by it. Some of these are consumers
whose claims may seem de minimis but who alone have no practical
recourse for either remuneration or injunctive relief.
Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text for
a discussion of how small awards discourage lawsuits.
162. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
163. Giummo v. Citibank, N.A., 107 Misc. 2d 895, 898, 436 N.Y.S.2d 172, 174
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1981).
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actions against manufacturers and suppliers of goods and services.1 4
Railroad companies provide consumer services; and by selling sub-
standard services, they violate consumers' rights. The class action
device is appropriate in commuter litigation against railroads. 65
A class action by commuters against a specific railroad could meet
the numerosity requirement. 16 6 For example, the Long Island Rail-
road has 140,000 round trip riders each day' 67 while Metro-North has
180,000 daily round trip riders.16 8 In a consumer action against an
unlicensed laboratory, the court held that "the required numerosity is
obviously present since it appears That there could be as many as
100,000 members of the class.' 6 If the class is too large, however, the
court could create subclasses.1 70 Each of these could consist of riders
from a specific railroad line. One approach to the formation of the
class would be to consider only those purchasing monthly or weekly
164. See, e.g., Simon, 75 A.D.2d 283, 428 N.Y.S.2d 952 (lst Dep't 1980). The
court granted class status to a consumer group which alleged that defendant provided
it with inferior service and accommodations on a cruise ship. In Ludmer v. Franklin
Career Search Int'l, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 8, 1981, at 12, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1981), the court certified a class action in a lawsuit by consumers against the
defendant for fraudulent advertising. The plaintiff-representative paid $2,610 for the
promised services to get a new job and defendant failed to perform as advertised. The
court held that a private right of action exists to enforce consumer legislation. Id. at
13, col. 1 (quoting Memorandum of Assemblyman Harold L. Strelzin). In Hyde v.
General Motors, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30, 1981, at 5, col.3 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1981),
the court certified a class action in a lawsuit by consumers against General Motors for
alleged breaches of express and implied warranties. The consumers alleged that
General Motors had used improper materials in certain trucks and had failed to
develop an appropriate design for the trucks. The court held that a class action may
be used to recover actual damages. Id. at 5, col. 6. In Guadagno v. Diamond Tours
& Travel, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 697, 392 N.Y.S.2d 783 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976), the
court certified a class consisting of purchasers of travel tours to a Jamaican resort.
The plaintiffs alleged fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of contract by de-
fendant in supplying inferior services. The court held that the legislative purpose
behind CPLR article 9 was to provide a procedural remedy for violations of con-
sumer rights. Id. at 699, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
165. The applicable statute for the railroad's liability is N.Y. TRANSP. LAW § 111
(McKinney 1975) and not New York General Business Law. This is an analogy to a
situation where a class action is used to redress infringements of consumer rights.
166. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the numer-
osity requirement.
167. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1983, at B2, col. 6; cf. Felder v. Foster, 71 A.D.2d 71,
74, 421 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (4th Dep't 1979) (court held that 2000 member class is too
large for joinder).
168. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1983, at Al, col. 5. Joinder of potentially thousands of
members is impractical. Gilman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 93
Misc. 2d 941, 943, 404 N.Y.S.2d 258, 261 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
169. See Goldman v. Garofalo, 96 Misc. 2d 790, 793, 409 N.Y.S.2d 684, 686 (Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1978).
170. See N.Y. Cv. PRAC. LAW § 906(2) (McKinney 1976).
[Vol. XlI
RAILROAD CLASS ACTIONS
commutation tickets. These riders are subject to the same conditions
daily and although such a class would omit infrequent riders, there
would be fewer problems with predominant common questions. Fur-
thermore, if the class action helps reform railroad service, all riders
will benefit.
A commuter class action would not pose notice problems. Since
individual notice is not required under CPLR Article 9,171 signs could
easily be posted on all the trains and flyers distributed to passengers. A
class action probably would not plant the seed of litigation in the
commuters' minds, since many have already brought suits 72 and oth-
ers have already recorded complaints about the substandard serv-
ice. 73 The numerosity requirement is satisfied when individual claims
are so small that individual suit by class members is not economically
feasible. 174
In a class composed of commutation ticketholders, common ques-
tions would clearly predominate. First, all class members have the
same contract of carriage with the defendant. Second, no individual
inducements by the railroad exist that would create varied individual
questions of reliance. In Simon v. Cunard Line,17 5 the court held that
a common question existed among the passengers of a charter ship.
Since all the passengers suffered common complaints while aboard the
ship, the predominant common question requirement was whether
the passengers received the cruise they purchased. 176 The same type of
common question exists among weekday train commuters. They each
endure the same standard of performance during the daily rush hours.
These breaches of the carriage contract are the focus of the litigation;
no individual questions would predominate.17 7
171. See N.Y. Civ. Pn.c. LAW § 904(b) (McKinney 1976); accord Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("where a class consists of a large
number of claimants with relatively small individual claims, notice to individual
class members, as a legal and practical matter, becomes less important and need not
be unduly emphasized or required").
172. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for a discussion of the suits brought
against Metro-North and the Long Island Railroad.
173. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1983, at B6, col. 5 (commuters complain about lack of
airconditioning on commuter trains and subways).
174. See Strauss, 89 Misc. 2d at 829, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 345 (citing Swanson v.
American Consumer Indus., 415 F.2d 1326, 1333 (7th Cir. 1969)).
175. 75 A.D.2d 283, 428 N.Y.S.2d 952 (1st Dep't 1980).
176. Id. at 289, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
177. See Goldman, 96 Misc. 2d at 793, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 686. The court held:
The questions of law and fact appear to be common to the class inasmuch
as the action seeks only a refund of moneys paid .... These questions are
the same for all members of the class and the only difference among
1984]
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In a class action by commuters against a railroad, any commutation
ticketholder would have a claim that is typical of the claims of all the
class members. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin7 s , the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the claim of a purchaser of an
odd lot on the New York Stock Exchange was typical of the claims of
the class consisting of odd lot traders. 79 This representative, as well as
the other class members, alleged an excessive price differential. "[AIll
members of the class, including those who would otherwise prefer to
abide by the status quo, will be helped if the rates are found to be
excessive."'' 8 Similarly, each commuter's claim results from the same
breaches of the carriage contract: lengthy delays, cancelled trains and
equipment failures. 8' There are no different contractual provisions
which pertain to various individuals.
In a class action against a railroad, one of several commuters could
serve as a representative and adequately protect the interests of the
entire class. The court would investigate the financial status of the
chosen representative to ensure that adequate notice will be given to
the class members. 182 A financially secure representative would have
the resources to assert vigorously the rights of the class members. The
representative must also have the ability to protect adequately the
class' interests. 8 3 If the representative were a commutation ticket
holder, it is unlikely that the suit would be collusive or that the
representative's interest would conflict with the interests of other class
members.184 Since the purpose of the class action is to provide a means
individual members would be as to the specific amount paid. That differ-
ence is an insufficient reason for a holding that there is not the required
commonality of interest.
Id. Similarly, in a commuter lawsuit, the members of the class would only be seeking
a refund of all or part of the money paid.
178. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (Court remanded
because Second Circuit conducted preliminary inquiry into merits of suit in order to
determine whether class could be certified). On remand, the District Court held that
the suit could be maintained as a class action. 54 F.R.D. 565, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
179. Id. at 562.
180. Id.
181. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
182. See Stern v. Carter, 97 Misc. 2d 775, 777, 412 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1979). "[P]laintiff ... must clearly demonstrate that he has and will
use sufficient financial resources to fairly and adequately represent the class involved,
and that his financial resources are adequate to pursue the suit to completion .
id.
183. Id. at 780, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 337 ("plaintiff's knowledge and competency may
be discovered in the process of inquiring as to how much he knows about his own case
to enlighten the court in regard to his real ability to represent the class").
184. See Eisen, 391 F.2d at 562, for a discussion of this consideration.
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of vindicating small claims, to deny class status because of the small
amount of the representative's interest would be to ignore the spirit of
Article 9.185 If a class action is brought against the railroads, the
attorney will have to be carefully chosen to ensure proper conduct.
The court will deny class certification if the attorney appears to act for
his own benefit. 186
In a commuter class action against railroads, the class action is
superior to other methods of adjudication because it is the only practi-
cal and economically feasible procedural device. There are too many
potential plaintiffs for joinder18 7 and individual litigation is too expen-
sive and time consuming when compared to the nominal damages
normally awarded. 18 Federal courts have found that the class action
is the superior method of adjudication when the facts show that there
are numerous plaintiffs who have little incentive to enforce their
rights individually and would not otherwise seek recovery. 18
2. Subdivision of Classes as an Aid to Class Certification
CPLR section 906190 permits the court, in its discretion, to subdi-
vide the class if it finds that the class is actually composed of two or
185. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 495 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (discussing
Federal Rule 23); accord WEINSTEIN, supra note 101, § 901.11.
186. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the neces-
sity of the attorney's honesty.
187. Federal Rule 19 states that a person
shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair
or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple,
or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
188. See Guadagno v. Diamond Tours & Travel, Inc., 89 Misc. 2d 697, 698, 392
N.Y.S.2d 783, 784 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976) ("class action relief may well be
necessary to vindicate the rights of members of the class, whose individual claims are
otherwise too small (under $500) to warrant independent litigation . .
189. See, e.g., Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972) (in
determining that class action was superior, Court considered dispositive finding, on
earlier motion, that plaintiff's action would go no further without designation as
class); Dura-Bilt Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 89 F.R.D. 87, 103 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (Federal Rule 23(b)(3) action is clearly superior when large number of mem-
bers is involved, whose claims are too small to warrant individual suits); Stavrides v.
Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 60 F.R.D. 634, 636 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (in suits,
"where great numbers of people assert relatively small claims", denial of class status
would decisively terminate litigation).
190. N.Y. Civ. PrAc. LAW § 906 (McKinney 1976)
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more subclasses with different interests.'"' This provision helps assure
that all members of the class are adequately represented when differ-
ent or conflicting interests exist and may prevent dismissal based solely
on manageability problems.9 2 Subclasses may be appropriate in com-
muter class actions, if certain railway lines experience more delays
and equipment failures than others. If such a situation exists, each
subclass could present its own evidence and receive its own relief.
IV. Policy Considerations
A class action by commuters for damages against railroads for
breach of the carriage contract can meet all the prerequisitess of
CPLR Article 9. Commuters on a specific line would be too numerous
for joinder. 9 3 The common question of the railroad's liability for
breaches caused by delays and equipment failures would predomi-
nate. 9 4 Since all commuters purchase the same type of ticket and are
subject to the same conditions on the trains, the claim of the represent-
ative would be typical of the entire class' claims.19 5 A carefully se-
lected commuter representative could adequately protect the class'
interests since he would argue for improved train service and reim-
bursement for the substandard service endured. 96 Finally, the class
action device is superior to any other method of adjudication because
it allows the prospective plaintiffs a forum they would otherwise not
enjoy in which to adjudicate their claims under the substantive law.19
Carriers have been isolated from full common law liability arising
from delays and cancellations and equipment failures."' The rail-
roads must deliver the services contracted for by passengers. These
services include more than mere transportation between two loca-
tions. 19 9 A class action would combine small individual claims and
191. Id. § 906(2).
192. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 101, § 906.03.
193. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the first
prerequisite of the class action statute.
194. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the second
prerequisite of the class action statute.
195. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the third
prequisite of the class action statute.
196. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fourth
prerequisite of the class action.
197. See supra note 187-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fifth
prerequisite of the class action.
198. See supra note 7 and accompanying text for a discussion of how nominal
damages have been awarded for constant breaches of the carriage contract.




create the possibility of a substantial recovery. This aggregated claim
would encourage an attorney to litigate the suit. 200 If class action
status were denied, relief for a grievous wrong would be denied to all
members of the class and the public would suffer.
In addition to class members, the public will also benefit from class
actions against railroads. The wrongs that give rise to a class action
are public wrongs. An action in a small claims court by one individual
has no deterrent effect on the defendant railroad's activities. 20 How-
ever, the large damage awards possible in a class action suit decrease
the likelihood that a defendant will continue its wrongful practices.
202
Opponents of a commuter class action argue against certification
based on the ground that it would impose grievous hardships on
railroad corporations. 20 3 According to these opponents, if railroads are
forced to remedy their statutory violations, they will cease operations
or raise fares. It is unlikely that New York State would allow com-
muter rail service to end. 20 4 New York commuters are dependent upon
the railroads for transportation.2 05 The problems resulting from the
200. See Cannon v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 106 Misc.
2d 1060, 1069, 433 N.Y.S.2d 378, 385 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1980), modified, 87
A.D.2d 403, 451 N.Y.S.2d 817 (2d Dep't 1980) (contingency fee held appropriate in
class action context; "this ... would seem to be a predictable element of any class
action brought by plaintiffs with individually small damage claims or where their
financial resources are limited"). "Substantial counsel fees may even be an acceptable
incentive to encourage forceful prosecution of cases imbued with the public interest."
Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927, 931 n.5 (7th Cir. 1972)
(class action brought by grocery store owners alleging that defendant conspired with
dairy products companies to restrain and monopolize interstate trade) (citing Dolgow
v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
201. See Giummo v. Citibank, N.A., 107 Misc. 2d 895, 898, 436 N.Y.S.2d 172,
174 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1981) ("prophylactic effect of the threat of class action
exposure ... elevates ... a lawsuit ... from the ineffective nuisance category to the
type of suit which has enough sting in it to insure that management will strive with
diligence to achieve compliance") (citing 119 CONG. REC. 25,419) (daily ed. July 23,
1983) (statement of Sen. Hart on Class Actions and Truth-in-Lending Act)); WEIN-
STEIN, supra note 101, § 901.06.
202. See Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 304-05 (1974)(excerpts from Symposium
before Judicial Conference of 5th Judicial Circuit) (class action allows judge to
rectify "institutional" problems; "there is no comparable deterrent to unlawful con-
duct . . ."). See also Beekman v. City of New York, 65 A.D.2d 317, 319, 411
N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (1st Dep't 1979) (per curiam) (class action brings more prompt
resolution of issues in question).
203. See Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 59 F.R.D. 602, 608 (N.D. I11. 1973)
(federal courts have denied class action status where it "'would result in absurdly high
or ruinous damages, wholly unrelated to the actual harm caused by the violations").
204. See infra note 207 and accompanying text for former Governor Carey's view
on the importance of our transit system.
205. N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1983, at B1, col. 1; Id., Mar. 20, 1983, § 22, at 2, col.
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railroad strike in 1983 exemplify this.2 °6 Furthermore, terminating
commuter service contravenes New York's public policy to conserve
energy. As former New York Governor Carey stated, "Our transporta-
tion system plays a pivotal role in strengthening our State's economy
.... In a time of energy shortages, it is essential to provide a compre-
hensive program of energy conservation .... .207 However, extensive
inefficiency exists in railroad operations. 20 8 A class action, combined
with the media publicity that might arise, could pressure the railroads
to discontinue wasteful practices and funnel their funds toward im-
proving service. The only hardship that would be imposed on rail-
roads by a class action would be the pressure to comply with statutory
standards.
A class action enforces substantive rights which, in its absence, are
meaningless because no other procedural device permits aggrieved
persons to assert them. 20 9 The Supreme Court has noted: "The aggre-
gation of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an
evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the
regulatory action of government. 2 °10 Without such a procedural de-
vice, the defendant railroads have no incentive to change. Decreased
ridership might achieve the same result but riders are too dependent
206. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1983, § 23, at 3, col. 1.
207. GOVERNOR'S APPROVAL MEMORANDUM ON TRANSPORTATION BOND ISSUE, c.369,
APPROVAL #78, June 28, 1979.
208. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1983, at B2, col. 6. One example of the railroad's
inefficiency is the millions of dollars that will be saved by installing automatic fare
collectors. Id.
209. See Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank of Jackson v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338
(1980) (there has been an "increasing reliance on the 'private attorney general' for the
vindication of legal rights; obviously this development has been facilitated by [Fed-
eral] Rule 23"). See also N.Y.L.J., May 2, 1972, at 4, col. 3.
The existence of class action litigation may also play a substantial role in
bringing about more efficient administrative enforcement and in inducing
legislative action.
The matter touches on the issue of the credibility of our judicial system.
Either we are committed to make reasonable efforts to provide a forum for
adjudication of disputes involving all our citizens-including . . . con-
sumers . . .- or we are not. There are those who will not ignore the irony
of courts ready to imprison a man who steals some goods in interstate
commerce while unwilling to grant a civil remedy against the corporation
which has benefited, to the extent of many millions of dollars, from
collusive, illegal pricing of its goods to the public. When the organization
of a modern society, such as ours, affords the possibility of illegal behavior
accompanied by widespread, diffuse consequences, some procedural
means must exist to remedy-or at least to deter-that conduct.
Id.
210. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 445 U.S. at 339.
RAILROAD CLASS ACTIONS
on railroads for transportation for this to be considered a realistic
answer. 211 Class actions often utilize the threat of expensive litigation
to compel settlement. 212 However, they seek to vindicate the rights of
the public and save time, effort and expense 21 3
V. Conclusion
Commuter railroads continuously breach their carriage contracts
and thereby violate the common law and statutory standards of per-
formance imposed upon them. Individual litigation is not a practical
way to enforce these standards because of the small amounts awarded
commuters in actions against railroads. A more effective procedural
device is needed to remedy these violations of law. The class action is
such a device. Therefore, the narrow interpretation given CPLR Arti-
cle 9 by the courts should be broadened to conform with its legislative
purpose. New York courts should certify a commuter class action since
it fulfills the five prerequisites under CPLR Article 9. By redressing
violations of law by railroads, the class action device would achieve
individual justice and would benefit the general public.
Maura E. O'Sullivan
211. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
212. Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 389
(1972).
The class action device can be used to coerce a settlement even without
filing suit. Most experienced defense counsel have participated in negotia-
tions toward settlement of a dispute at which counsel for the potential
plaintiff threatens to file a massive class action to intimidate the potential
defendant into a favorable settlement.
Id. at 390. Many corporations would rather settle with the representative than face
an expensive and unwieldly lawsuit. Homburger, Private Suits in the Public Interest
in the United States of America, 23 BUFF. L. REV. 343, 354 (1974) (no alternative to
settlement exists in massive common question suits).
213. See Mimnorm Realty Corp. v. Sunrise Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 83 A.D.2d
936, 938, 442 N.Y.S.2d 780, 783 (2d Dep't 1981)(mem.) (class action certification
will serve goals of economies of time and effort, and promote uniformity of decision).
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